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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine whether corporate governance changes along the
corporate life-cycle.
Design/methodology/approach – In a sample of 205 firms from 21 emerging market countries and
using a life-cycle proxy from the dividends literature, the authors use a governance-prediction model
which examines whether corporate governance differs along the corporate life-cycle.
Findings – Mature firms tend to practice better overall corporate governance. Discipline and
independence improve as firms mature. Firms tend to be most transparent and accountable when they
are young. These findings suggest that the resource/strategy and monitoring/control governance
functions are relevant but at different life-cycle stages.
Research limitations/implications – In the absence of longitudinal governance data with
sufficient coverage to track within-firm changes in corporate governance along the corporate life-cycle,
the authors analyze differences in corporate governance between-firms at different life-cycle stages.
Originality/value – The authors use an alternative, yet new measure from the dividends literature to
account for the firm’s position along the corporate life-cycle. With this new measure, the findings are in
line with the predictions of Filatotchev et al. (2006).
Keywords Corporate governance, Emerging markets, Corporate life-cycle
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
In the last ten years or so much attention has been devoted to the study of corporate
governance. For example, a search of “empirical corporate governance” in SSRN
returns 1,377 studies. This work has been made possible by the availability of corporate
governance measures, which makes comparisons of governance quality between firms,
in and across countries, possible (e.g. Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA), 2001),
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), and the modified Gompers et al. (2003) “G-Index”
of Bebchuk et al. (2009) (i.e. the “E-Index”))[1].
Two lines of inquiry which has attracted much attention are governance-to-value
and governance-prediction studies. The former examines whether a causal relationship
exists between corporate governance and firm value (e.g. Brown and Caylor, 2006;
Gompers et al., 2003; Bebchuk et al., 2009, 2011; Black et al., 2006a). The latter seeks to
identify the firm- and country-level factors which shape corporate governance practices
in firms (e.g. Klapper and Love, 2004; Durnev and Kim, 2005; Black et al., 2006;
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Doidge et al., 2007). While these studies are unlikely to be completely free from concerns
regarding endogeneity, they typically conclude that governance causes value, and
a range of country- and firm-level factors determine corporate governance choice
(see Black et al., 2012). The collective findings suggest that, large, high growth firms,
with a need for external finance are better-governed, but that firms that exhibit these
characteristics may not practice better governance in countries where the benefits of
adopting better-governance do not outweigh the costs of doing so (see Doidge et al., 2007).
Notwithstanding the voluminous nature of corporate governance research, one
aspect that has been largely neglected in the literature is, whether and to what extent,
governance evolves along the corporate life-cycle. In fact the scarcity of work in this
specific area led Filatotchev et al. (2006, pp. 257 and 274) to assert that:
“Much attention has been focussed on the largest mature companies listed on
a stock market, concentrating on the static theorising of the principal-agent perspective.
Less attention has therefore been paid to the change processes in governance and
variations in the principal-agent relationship through the life-cycle of the firm from
inception to maturity […], and that analysis of the post-IPO evolution of the firm’s
governance system is a key research issue.”
In defence of researchers, the dearth of work in this area is in large part due to the
nature of the data on offer. Consider the type of data required to undertake such an
exercise. The researcher requires a measure of the strength of corporate governance
from corporate inception through to maturity and beyond[2]. There are a number of
issues here. First, much of the governance data on offer is for publicly traded firms
only. A second issue relates to the duration of governance data for individual firms
post-IPO. To the best of our knowledge, no governance measure exists which offers the
scope to track corporate governance quality from the IPO stage (or earlier) through
the growth stage to maturity, and beyond (i.e. stagnation and decline). For example,
the G-Index covers four years, while the governance-index of Black et al. (2006a) dates
from 1999 to 2005. The underlying issue here is that while these governance-indices are
well-suited to the study of governance in calendar time (e.g. De Nicolo et al., 2008), none
are perfectly tailored to the study of corporate governance over the entire corporate
life-cycle, since for many firms, the firm life-cycle is much longer than the coverage of
most, if not all, of the governance indices on offer (see Miller and Friesen, 1984).
With this in mind, we adopt what we believe to be a next-best approach. We use
governance data for a sample of firms from emerging markets, and seek to identify
differences in corporate governance practices for firms who, at a particular point in
time (2001), are at different life-cycle stages[3]. In this regard, our paper is materially
different to others. Others examine the firm- and country-level factors which shape the
governance practices of firms at a particular point in time[4]. We examine whether
these firms, whom are at different life-cycle stages, have different governance practices.
Given the nature of our governance data, we do not, nor cannot, track within-firm
changes in governance along the entire corporate life-cycle. Instead, our focus is on
identifying differences in governance practices between firms. Filatotchev et al. (2006)
outline a framework which hypothesizes that as firms’ progress along their life-cycle,
so too does their corporate governance function, as the wealth creation and wealth
preservation functions of governance are required at different life-cycle stages.
The governance data we use is suited to test the predictions of Filatotchev et al. (2006),
because it covers broad aspects of governance, for example, independence,
accountability, and transparency which are cornerstones of the conceptual
framework which Filatotchev et al. (2006) develop. A governance index with a much
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narrower focus (e.g. the G-Index focusses almost exclusively in anti-takeover provisions)
would make such an empirical exercise impossible.
To identify firms at different stages of their life-cycle, we use a measure from the
dividend literature. DeAngelo et al. (2006) test the life-cycle model of dividends using
the ratio of earned (retained) to total equity (or total assets) as a proxy for firm maturity.
As firms mature, the contribution of earned equity to total equity (earned plus
contributed equity) increases, since as firms mature, they become more profitable, have
less growth opportunities, and generate greater cashflow from operations, which all
results in an increase in earned equity, and a reduced reliance on contributed (external)
equity. We examine how corporate governance changes, if at all, as the firm matures,
using the DeAngelo et al. (2006) measure to account for the firm life-cycle.
Using a governance-prediction model, we show that governance quality improves as
firms mature. Transparency, independence and accountability are all prominent at
different, but not necessarily the same life-cycle stages. Our findings suggest that
a policy which mandates a “one-size-fits-all” governance code will not fit with the needs
of all firms, and in some instances, such a policy will expose some firms to the costs of
adhering to certain governance provisions whose adoption would not prove to be
beneficial at their specific life-cycle stage. Our findings do not necessarily suggest that
“across the board” rules are not beneficial (Atanasov et al. (2010) say they can be).
Rather they suggest that a more flexible approach which grants firms more discretion
over their own governance choices, say for example, along the lines of “comply or
explain” would seem to make more sense.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the literature. Section 3
describes the data, Section 4 the methodology, and Section 5 discusses our findings.
Section 6 concludes.
2. Related literature
Our paper is positioned within a field of corporate governance commonly referred to as
governance-prediction studies. These studies use firm-level governance rankings,
performed either using a number of countries (e.g. Klapper and Love (2004)) or using
individual country case-studies (e.g. Black et al. (2006)) to determine the firm- and
country-level factors which predict corporate governance practices in firms.
The firm-level variables typically include size, growth opportunities, external
financing need, asset tangibility, and whether a firm is cross-listed abroad (in the US).
Some add research and development expenditures, and exports to this list. Doidge et al.
(2007) also include the cash holdings of firms and the ownership structure of the firm.
Black et al. (2006) use the richest set of firm-level attributes. They also use firm risk,
leverage, profitability, market share, capital expenditures, and advertising. With some
exceptions, these studies find that large, growing firms, with an external financing
need, large cash positions, and who are riskier, are better-governed. Cross-listing firms
are better-governed. Profitability and asset tangibility substitute for governance.
The country-level variables used capture aspects of financial and legal development.
Country (rule of law and/or country shareholder rights) and corporate governance
complement one another. Doidge et al. (2007) demonstrate that financial development
matters for corporate governance, since poor financial development prevents firms
from practicing better governance because the benefits from doing so (e.g. raising
equity capital on liquid equity markets) do not outweigh the costs. Hugill and Siegel
(2012) suggest that country-level factors do not dominate firm-level characteristics to
the extent to which Doidge et al. (2007) say they do.
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Individually and collectively, these studies enhance our understanding of what
determines the governance practices of firms. However, one drawback is that their
focus is narrow and static, and fails to examine how governance changes as firms
change, or specifically, how governance changes as firms move along their life-cycle.
They do include firm-level variables. However, different firm-level characteristics imply
differing relationships between corporate governance and the firm life-cycle.
For example, consider the effects of profitability and external financing need on the
governance practices of firms. All else equal, governance quality increases (decreases)
in a firms external finance need (profitability). However, when firms are “immature”
they are typically unprofitable, with a large external finance need, which tends to
reverse when firms mature. This then implies that, all else equal, firms practice better
governance when they are “immature” and governance quality deteriorates as they
mature. On the other hand, the free cash flow hypothesis of Jensen (1986, 1993)
suggests that the agency costs of free cash flow are most severe when firms are mature.
Thus, one could argue then, that along the lines of Jensen (1986, 1993), governance
quality should be the greatest when agency conflicts are most acute, that is, when firms
are mature. Filatotchev et al. (2006) also allude to the greater need required of the
monitoring role of governance as firms mature. Thus, we tend to agree with the assertion
of Filatotchev et al. that an analysis of corporate governance across the life-cycle of the
firm is an important avenue of research. It appears to us at least, that based on the existing
empirical evidence, a question remains regarding the nature of the relationship between
a firms governance practices and its life-cycle.
3. Data
We use the corporate governance scores developed by CLSA (2001), which range from
a low of 0 to a high of 100. Higher values suggest better governance. All ratings are
calculated in 2001. The rating for each individual firm, for which there are 495 in total
across 25 countries, is a composite measure of 57 qualitative, binary questions which span
seven distinct governance categories, namely management discipline, transparency,
independence, accountability, responsibility, fairness (all have a 15 percent weighting),
and social awareness (10 percent weight). We use the first six governance provisions
to construct the composite governance measure. Filatotchev et al. (2006) differentiate
between the strategic/resource and monitoring/control functions of governance[5].
Five (excluding transparency) of the six CLSA governance provisions relate to monitoring
and control. Two provisions, namely independence and accountability, likely capture both
the resource/strategy and monitoring/control functions, since both measures account for
different characteristics of the board of directors.
We use a measure from the dividend literature to proxy for a firm’s position along
their corporate life-cycle (or firm maturity), namely the ratio of earned equity (retained
earnings) to total assets (see DeAngelo et al., 2006; Brockman and Unlu, 2011). Mature
(immature) firms are characterized with high (low, mostly negative) ratios of earned
equity to total assets and earned equity to total equity. Since we use public firms alone,
our analysis is restricted to how governance changes between quadrants 2 (post-IPO
young firms) and quadrant 3 (mature firms) of the Filatotchev et al. (2006) framework[6].
The retained earnings (to total assets) and other unreported variables, namely dividend
payout, profitability, external financing dependence, and free cash flow all suggest that
there are firms in our sample in both quadrants 2 and 3. For example, consider Table III
which divides our sample of firms into quartiles. Quartile 1 firms have negative RE/TA
(reported), pay no dividend, have a large external financing need and are unprofitable
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(all unreported). As we proceed from quartile 2 to quartile 4, firms mature (i.e. RE/TA
increases). They initiate and continue to pay larger dividends, have positive free
cash flow, no longer rely as much on external finance, and are profitable
(all unreported). Finally, the RE/TE (and RE/TA) measure is consistent with the
resource-based view of the firm, which is interrelated to the firms governance function,
and is also consistent with the notion of the firm’s financial life-cycle (see Filatotchev
et al. (2006)).
We control for a number of determinants of corporate governance, commonly
employed in other studies (see literature review for references). The firm-level controls
are firm size, growth, profitability, cash holdings, dependence on external finance,
and a cross-listing (in the USA (in 2001)) dummy variable. All information on US
cross-listings is sourced from the Bank of New York-Mellon (www.adrbnymellon.com),
and cross-referenced with data from Citibank (wwss.citissb.com/adr). We group all 66
cross-listing firms together, rather than differentiate by listing type. All firm-level
variables are sourced from Worldscope and a description of each is provided in
Appendix 1. Based on the existing evidence, size is expected to be positively related to
governance. Growing firms with a dependence on external finance invest in governance.
In contrast, self-financing, profitable firms have little need to follow suit. Recent evidence
suggests that poorly governed firms hold more cash than well-governed firms
(see Ammann et al., 2011). Cross-listing firms are expected to be better-governed than
non-cross-listing firms, although it is not clear whether better governance is
a prerequisite to, or a consequence of cross-listing. The difference in governance quality
between firms may be evident prior to cross-listing (see Wojcik et al., 2005), but for
firms cross-listing in the USA as Level 2 or Level 3 exchange-traded ADRs, the bonding
hypothesis suggests that their governance is likely to improve once they cross-list
(see Stulz, 1999; Coffee, 1999, 2002).
We use four country-level determinants of corporate governance, namely stock
market development; (country) shareholder rights, culture and economic development
(see Appendix 1 for a full description of each variable). Country and corporate
governance tend to complement each other (see Klapper and Love, 2004), while firms
reap larger benefits from improved governance where stock markets and the economy
is highly developed (see Doidge et al., 2007; Aggarwal et al., 2009). Griffin et al. (2013)
find that culture is positively related to corporate governance.
Our final sample of 205 publicly traded firms is outlined in Table I. Taiwan (31)
provides the most firms. Argentina, Hungary, Peru, and Poland provide a single firm
each. The median (MED) and standard deviation (SD) retained earnings (to total assets)
suggest that firms are most mature (and at much later stages of their life-cycle) in
Mexico and Malaysia, and least so in Brazil[7]. The greatest variation in firm maturity
tends to occur in Hong Kong. Governance quality is highest in Mexico, but less so in
Pakistan. Hong Kong (13) and Taiwan (12) provide the largest number of cross-listing
firms. Stock markets tend to be developed in Hong Kong, but less so in Pakistan.
Shareholder rights are strong in, among others, Brazil and Chile, and weak in China.
Individualism prevails in Hungary, collectivism in Colombia. Hong Kong and
Singapore are the most developed economies in our sample.
Table II outlines the country sample median and standard deviation for each
individual corporate governance component. Firms tend to be most transparent (TPY)
in Chile, and opaque in Pakistan. Discipline (DIS) is high in Turkey, but not so in
Poland. The median firm in Singapore scores highly across all aspects of governance.
In contrast, the median firm in Pakistan scores poorly across all six governance
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components. In some countries, the median firm scores highly in some governance
measures, but not so in others (e.g. Hong Kong).
4. Methodology
In this section, we explore the relationship between firm maturity (life-cycle) and
corporate governance practices. Consider Table III. Here we divide our sample of firms
into four quartiles based on RE/TA. From lowest to highest quartile, the average
(median) ratio of retained earnings (to total assets) changes from −0.157 (0.003) to
0.466 (0.432) (see top panel of Table III). For the average and median firm, corporate
governance improves with RE/TA (see middle and bottom panels of Table III). For the
median firm, corporate governance improves from 51.68 in quartile 1 to 61.95 in quartile 4.
The improvement in governance over the life-cycle results from improvements in
discipline, independence, responsibility, and fairness. Transparency is highest at either
ends of the firm-maturity spectrum, while firms are most accountable when they are
immature (Quartile 1).
In Tables IV and V, we examine whether these same relationships hold once we
control for firm, industry, and country-level determinants of corporate governance.
To do so, we estimate a series of ordinary and weighted least squares regressions,
which regress corporate governance on our corporate life-cycle measure, and a full set of
firm, industry (based on four-digit SIC codes) and country-level controls. All regressions
are estimated with heteroscedastic-consistent robust standard errors. In the bottom
panels of Tables IV and V, we estimate a series of weighted least squares regressions to
alleviate concerns that our findings are driven by differences in the number of firms
across countries. In the weighted least squares regressions, the weight of each
observation (firm) is the inverse of the number of observations in each country, so that
each country receives an equal weighting.
Our governance prediction model is unlikely to be completely free from endogeneity
concerns. First, there is the issue of omitted-variable bias. The issue here is that
corporate governance is likely to be correlated with a number of firm/country-level
variables, which in turn are likely to be correlated with each other. If we exclude
a (relevant) variable, which is correlated with both firm life-cycle (RE/TA) and corporate
governance, then we may incorrectly infer that the firm life-cycle and governance are
related, where in fact, they are only related through their common relationship with
the omitted variable. To try and alleviate some of this concern, we include a rich set of
control variables. Given the nature of the corporate governance data that we use,
and even with the inclusion of a number of (observable) control variables, we are,
nevertheless, unable to control for unobserved heterogeneity. Second, and also of
concern is the notion of reverse causality. Rather than firm maturity predicting
governance, governance may in fact predict firm-maturity. For example, if we allude to
the corporate life-cycle stages of Miller and Friesen (1984) (the stages are birth, growth,
maturity, revival, and decline phases), better-governance may facilitate the transition
from the birth to the growth stage since better governance helps to reduce the cost
of capital. Since we lack a suitable instrument for corporate governance and use
cross-sectional governance data, we cannot address these concerns in this paper.
5. Results and discussion
Consider Table IV. The coefficient estimates suggest that mature firms practice better
corporate governance. In all six regressions the coefficient estimates on the firm
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life-cycle variable is positive, and is statistically significant in five of the six cases. The
last column of Table VI calculates the effect that a two standard deviation change in
each independent variable has on corporate governance (see column labeled Ec. Sig).
Economic significance is calculated based on the average absolute coefficient estimate
for each variable. For firm maturity (life-cycle), the change in governance is 3.08,
which implies a 5.52 percent change in governance practices for the median firm
(i.e. (3.08/55.82)× 100)[8]. These findings are at odds with Black et al. (2006) who find
that the governance practices of Korean firms are unaffected by the number of years
listed on the stock exchange.
In contrast to both Klapper and Love (2004) and Black et al. (2006), we find that
smaller firms are better-governed. Interestingly, neither profitability nor growth is
significantly related to corporate governance. With one exception, both are of the
correct sign, but remain statistically insignificant. Better-governed firms hold more
cash than their not so well-governed counterparts. As expected, dependence on
external finance is positively related to corporate governance, although it is only
statistically significant in one of three regressions. External financing need is also
statistically insignificant in the regressions of Durnev and Kim (2005) and Black et al.
(2006). Cross-listing firms are better governed than non-cross-listing firms, on average
by 6.07, which represents a governance premium of 11.05 percent over the median
non-cross-listed firm (i.e. (6.07/54.93)× 100)). Where all four country-level variables are
included simultaneously, only culture and economic development are statistically
significant. The positive coefficient estimate on culture confirms the findings of Griffin
et al. (2013). Governance is not necessarily better in more individualistic countries.
Rather, the positive coefficient suggests that governance ratings do a better job at
capturing the governance attributes of firms in countries with a culture of individualism.
Finally, the weighted least squares regressions confirm our earlier predictions that mature
firms practice better governance. Filatotchev et al. (2006) show that as firms mature from
quadrant 2 to 3, the resource/strategy role of governance becomes less relevant, while
the monitoring/control function becomes more important. Our findings suggest that the
declining relevance of resource/strategy function is more than offset by the prominence of
monitoring/control as firms mature, resulting in higher overall governance. In the next
section, we examine this issue in much greater detail (see Tables V and VI).
Table V presents a series of weighted least squares regressions. The dependent
variable is one of the six individual corporate governance provisions described
previously. Since growth and profitability are unrelated to governance, we exclude
them from Table V. We present estimates with and without country fixed-effects.
The coefficient estimates suggest that discipline, independence, responsibility, and fairness
are positively and statistically related to the corporate life-cycle. These findings are all
consistent with Filatotchev et al. (2006). Unexpectedly, the coefficient estimates on the
transparency and accountability measures are statistically significant. From an
economic significance viewpoint, changes in discipline (20.71) matter the most, followed
by fairness (10.35) and independence (9.86). Interestingly, the control variables affect
the individual governance provisions differently. For example, firms with a need for
external finance score highly in terms of discipline and transparency. Cross-listing
firms score higher than their non-cross-listing counterparts in terms of discipline,
transparency, responsibility and fairness.
In Table VI we examine how corporate governance and its individual components
change along the corporate life-cycle, but now using the same life-cycle (retained
earnings) quartiles created in Table II. This analysis potentially provides a much richer
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picture of how corporate governance evolves along the corporate life-cycle, since it does
not impose the same linear constraint as in Tables IV and V. It also facilitates a more
direct comparison with Filatotchev et al. (2006).
In all regressions, the reference group is Quartile 1 (from Table III). The coefficient
estimates reveal the following. First, the improvement in governance that we observe
in Table IV only comes about for the most mature firms (Q4 firms). For Q4 firms,
the coefficient is positive (2.016) and statistically significant. On inspection of the
components of governance, it is evident that this improvement in overall governance
comes about through improvements in corporate discipline and independence, both of
which capture aspects of monitoring and control. In both instances, governance is at its
highest for Q4 firms. For example, in the case of discipline, the coefficient estimate for
Q4 firms is 8.850. Given that average discipline for Q1 firms is 43.39, this implies that
discipline is 20.40 percent, i.e. (8.850/43.39)× 100, higher for Q4 when compared to Q1
firms. Using independence, the coefficient estimate for Q4 firms is 10.566. This implies
that independence is 19.19 percent i.e. (10.566/55.05)× 100 higher for Q4 than for Q1
firms. We find that firms tend to be most transparent and accountable at early stages
of their (public) life-cycle, i.e. Q1 firms, and both transparency and accountability
deteriorates as firms mature. The coefficient estimates suggest that Q1 firms are more
transparent and independent when compared to Q4 firms in the region of 19.20 percent
(i.e. (11.808/61.488)× 100) and 21.14 percent (i.e. (10.469/49.528)× 100), respectively.
To put our findings in perspective, we need to elaborate on the predictions
of Filatotchev et al. (2006). They differentiate between the resource/strategy and
monitoring/control functions of governance. In our paper, five of our six individual
CLSA governance provisions (All except transparency) likely capture aspects of
monitoring/control, while accountability and independence likely capture both the
resource/strategy and monitoring/control functions. Since, we only observe publicly
traded firms (i.e. quadrants 2 and 3), then, a priori, and according to Filatotchev et al. (2006),
we should observe lower transparency, greater monitoring (all individual governance
components excluding transparency), and a reduced role for the resource/strategy aspect of
governance as firms evolve from quadrants 2 to 3. Since accountability and independence
likely capture both the resource/strategy and monitoring/control functions, how they
change as the firm evolves is ambiguous.
Our findings are in line with Filatotchev et al. (2006). First, they suggest that as firms
mature the monitoring role of governance increases as enhanced monitoring “widens
the firm’s access to the financial resource base as it matures and exploits strategic
opportunities” (see Filatotchev et al. (2006, p. 260)). Discipline, independence, and
fairness all improve along the life-cycle, which are important aspects of the
monitoring/control functions of governance. Second, we also observe the deterioration
in corporate transparency that Filatotchev et al. (2006) predict will occur from quadrants
2 to 3. Reduced transparency manifests as “managerial rent-seeking opportunities
increase, rendering the governance system less transparent” (see Filatotchev et al. (2006,
p. 260)). Third, corporate independence (of the board) increases as the firm matures,
which is in line with the predictions of Filatotchev et al. (2006). Since board independence
captures aspects of both resource/strategy and monitoring/control, our finding that
boards become more independent as firms mature suggest that the reduced resource/
strategic role played by the board of directors is more than offset by the greater
monitoring that they now provide. Finally, we observe that accountability deteriorates as
the firm matures. Since, like the independence measure, accountability captures both
aspects of resource/strategy and monitoring/control, what we are most-likely capturing
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here is the decreased importance in the resource/strategy role of governance.
In summary, our findings do appear to highlight that the monitoring, and to a lesser
extent, the resource/strategy functions of governance change as the firm evolves along
its life-cycle. The net result is that overall governance is greatest for mature firms.
Our findings contribute to the debate on how governance rules should be
implemented. In some instances, governance standards are implemented across the
board, and thus assume that these rules suit and benefit all firms equally. Examples
include the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the USA, the listing rules on the New York Stock
Exchange, and the OECD principles on corporate governance. While there is evidence
which says that the implementation of “across the board” rules can work (see Atanasov
et al., 2010)), there also exists some evidence that suggests that they may not.
For example, “across the board” stock exchange listing requirements do not equally-benefit
all firms. Specifically, the fact that many firms cross-delisted from the US post
Sarbanes-Oxley (see Marosi and Massoud, 2008), and that many cross-listing firms,
particularly from emerging markets, choose to list in the US, but not on the New York
Stock Exchange (see Boubakri et al., 2010), suggests that the costs of adhering to these
additional legal rules may prove not to be beneficial for all. Furthermore, as illustrated
by Hope et al. (2013), many firms that choose to cross-list in the USA as Level 1 and
Rule 144a issues, voluntarily disclose more after they cross-list. This line of reasoning
points to a more flexible approach to governance adoption. Other examples include
“comply-or-explain” as adopted in Australia and the UK for example, or permitting
firms to list on different segments of the stock exchange, which is common place in
Brazil (see Braga-Alves and Shastri (2011)). Our findings suggest that a policy which
mandates a “one-size-fits-all” governance code for all firms in a country will not fit with
the needs of all firms in that country. While the adoption of “across the board” rules
have proven to be beneficial in some countries, a more flexible approach which grants
firms more discretion over their own governance choices, say for example, along the
lines of “comply or explain” would seem to make more sense, a policy prescription
which has important implications for the regulatory function in a country.
6. Conclusion
Much of the discussion in the corporate governance literature in recent years concerns
the debate about whether a “one-size-fits-all” approach is appropriate or whether
governance practices, which are dictated by a number of firm and country factors, and
their interaction, should be tailored to the specific needs of individual firms. While the
debate is ongoing, Black et al. (2012) present some compelling evidence in support of
the latter, and in doing so, propose a flexible governance model, which permits each
firm to choose what they believe to their own “optimal” level of governance.
One of the reasons that firms are likely to have very different governance needs at
any one point in time is because these firms are likely to be at very different stages in
their life-cycle. In turn, firms at different stages of their life-cycle are likely to have very
different governance needs, since the wealth creation and protection functions of
corporate governance change as the firm matures (see Filatotchev et al. (2006)).
In this paper we explore the relationship between corporate governance practices
and the corporate life-cycle. Since we are restricted to the use of cross-sectional governance
measures, our focus is on identifying differences in corporate governance quality between
firms who are at different stages of their life-cycle. We proxy for a firm’s position along
their life-cycle using the life-cycle proxy proposed by DeAngelo et al. (2006), and show
that, in line with the conceptual framework of Filatotchev et al. (2006), governance does
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indeed change along the corporate life-cycle. We show that individual governance
provisions (e.g. independence, accountability, transparency) are more relevant at
different stages of the corporate life-cycle, but not necessarily the same stage.
Since we show that overall governance, and more importantly the relevance of
individual governance provisions vary along the corporate life-cycle, our results
point to a flexible governance model which ensures that firms have sufficient
freedom to adopt what they believe is the correct governance model for them.
Previous literature finds that young, fast-growing firms are likely to establish good
corporate governance practices in order to attract external finance, increase
profitability, and therefore create value for the firm. Our findings suggest that since
governance quality is greatest when firms are mature, greater resources are devoted
to value preservation rather than value creation.
Finally, given the nature of the governance data that we use, we are cognizant of the
fact that the paper has limitations. These limitations are discussed in the introduction
and elsewhere, and as such we do not deem it necessary to discuss them in great detail
here again. While we cannot address the limitations in this paper, they do, nonetheless,
provide a number of important insights and avenues for future research. It would be
interesting to extend the sample coverage to a larger number of emerging and even
developed market firms. We believe that it is important to extend the sample to include
developed market firms since what we do know from the extant literature is that
optimal governance is likely to be different between developed and emerging market
firms (see Bebchuk and Hamdani, 2009). To address some of the endogeneity issues,
researchers should consider using governance data with a time-series dimension.
Notes
1. Others that construct their own corporate governance indices include Black et al. (2006,
2006a, 2012), and Aggarwal et al. (2009). Aggarwal et al. (2009) use 44 of the 64 ISS (2005)
governance attributes to compare the governance practices of US and non-US firms.
2. Helwege et al. (2007) examine the evolution of one aspect of internal-governance, namely
insider ownership from the IPO and beyond.
3. We do so since we do not have access to other governance data sources.
4. An exception is Braga-Alves and Morey (2011) who examine whether changes in firm and
country-level characteristics lead changes in governance.
5. Of course, resource and strategy are not the same. However, we group them together here as
they should be prominent at the same life-cycle stages (see Filatotchev et al. (2006)).
6. In quadrants 1 and 4, firms are privately-held.
7. To conserve space, we do not report the summary retained earnings to total equity statistics.
8. Our findings are qualitatively the same we use RE/TE and dividend payout (dividends to total
assets) in place of RE/TA. This analysis is available from the corresponding author upon request.
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Appendix
Corresponding author
Dr Thomas O’Connor can be contacted at: thomas.g.oconnor@nuim.ie
Variable Description Source
Corporate
governance
Equally-weighted composite measure of six distinct
governance categories, namely management discipline,
transparency, independence, accountability, responsibility,
and fairness
All CLSA (2001)
Discipline (DIS) Reflects public commitment to CG and financial discipline
Transparency
(TPY)
Reflects the ability of outsiders to assess the true position
of a company
Independence
(IND)
Reflects whether the board is independent of controlling
shareholders and is separate from senior management
Accountability
(ACC)
Designed to capture the proper accountability of management
to the board
Responsibility
(RES)
Record of taking measures in case of mismanagement
Fairness (FAIR) Records treatment of minorities
Life-cycle Earned equity (Retained Earnings) to total assets All Worldscope
Size Log of book assets in US$
Growth Logarithmic one-year asset growth
Profitability Earnings before interest and taxation (EBIT) to book assets
Cash Cash scaled by book assets
Dep. on external
finance
Capital expenditure less cashflow from operation scaled
by capital expenditure
Dividend payout Dividends to total assets
Cross-listing 1 if the firm is cross-listed in the USA Bank of New York,
Citibank.
Shareholder
rights
From Spamann (2010) and Djankov et al. (DLLS) (2008) (for
China, Hungary, and Poland where Spamann (2010 is
unavailable). The index of DLLS (2008) ranges from 1 (weak
shareholder rights) to 5 (strong shareholder rights). The
Spamann (2010) index ranges from 2 to 5 (using 1997 values)
Spamann (2010)
and Djankov et al.
(2008)
Stock market
capitalization
Stock market capitalization to GDP (in 2001) Updated version of
Beck et al. (2000)
Culture “Individualism” from Hofstede (2001) Hofstede (2001)
Economic
development
GDP per capita in US$ World Bank and
IMF
Industry
dummies
Industry dummies based on four-digit SIC codes Worldscope
Country
dummies
Country dummies. Argentina is the reference country Author
calculations
Table AI.
Variable descriptions
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